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Government ﬁ  nancial and performance guarantees have been issued in Croatia 
since 1996, to support funding and ensure favourable borrowing conditions in the 
ﬁ  nancial market for companies in majority state ownership. However, government 
guarantees have rarely been part of deﬁ  ned strategies and goals of public debt 
and risk management. Despite their steady growth, the structure of active guaran-
tees and their inﬂ  uence on Croatian public debt are still unknown. This paper 
analyses the amount and structure of state guarantees, their maturities and the 
authority and accountability for their management, and it compares the structure 
of guarantees in terms of economic sectors. The main objective of the paper is to 
determine the inﬂ  uence of government guarantees on the public debt growth.
Keywords: government guarantees, maturity, management, public debt, Croatia
1 INTRODUCTION
Government guarantees belong to contingent explicit liabilities, but are often clas-
siﬁ  ed as contingent implicit liabilities (e.g. deposit insurance). The problem is, 
however, that very often none of these contingent liability categories are included 
in ﬁ  scal policy analyses.
A government guarantee is a security instrument by which the government under-
takes to cover the liabilities for which the guarantee is issued. The most frequent 
examples are government guarantees of liabilities incurred by lower levels of go-
vernment and public enterprises, development banks and guarantee agencies, pu-
blic-private partnership projects and other forms of cooperation between the go-
vernment and private sector. Government guarantees are often used as a kind of 
aid for projects or activities producing a signiﬁ  cant welfare effect. They are most 
frequently issued to cover, partly or fully, the risk in the cases when the debtor is 
unable to repay a debt or meet another liability which has been guaranteed, or 
when the borrower fails to meet his/her liabilities within the agreed time limit. 
However, guarantees are not the most appropriate form of support for achieving a 
desired purpose (IMF, 2005). Particularly controversial are guarantees issued by 
other government institutions (e.g. development banks), because they are difﬁ  cult 
to monitor and supervise. Potential guarantee issuance costs to the government are 
positively correlated with the realisation risk of a ﬁ  nancial project, its value and 
duration (Polackova, 1998). Guarantees may involve many problems, because 
they are not supervised within regular budget expenditures. They can be used as a 
means to by-pass the government’s ﬁ  scal constraints on borrowing and on the 
amount of debt of the government and local units, which is why they can produce 
a hidden and adverse effect on the ﬁ  scal policy status. Brieﬂ  y, government guaran-
tees can be a threat to efﬁ  cient public ﬁ  nance management, because they are not 




























































































































255 nce and constitute an impediment to reliable projections of ﬁ  scal policy effects in 
the future.
The main objective of this article is to determine, based on the obtained informa-
tion, the key characteristics, the evolution and impact of government guarantees 
on Croatia’s public debt in the period from 1996 to 2010. The analysis relies on 
up-to-date information published in the Ofﬁ  cial Gazette, as well as annual and 
semi-annual reports on the state budget execution, organised in databases which 
comprise 1,113 ﬁ  nancial guarantees issued from 1996 to 2010 and 234 performance 
guarantees issued in the 1996-2008 period. 
2   INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ISSUE 
OF GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES
Government guarantees constitute security instruments by which the government 
warrants that an original debtor’s liability will be settled. The Budget Act (OG, 
87/08) governs the powers and obligations associated with the issue of govern-
ment guarantees, whereas the annual amount of new government guarantees and 
the conditions for their issuance are laid down in annual acts on the execution of 
the State Budget of the Republic of Croatia.
 
At the proposal of the Government, Parliament enacts a decision on the amounts 
of state debt1 and government guarantees in accordance with the amounts and 
purposes determined in the annual Budget and the State Budget Execution Act.
 
Guarantees can be approved by the Government and by Parliament. The bulk of 
guarantees are approved by the Government, but the amount of guarantees appro-
ved by Parliament is also signiﬁ  cant. Decisions to this effect are published in the 
Ofﬁ  cial Gazette. The Croatian Parliament approves guarantees of loans obtained 
from international ﬁ  nancial institutions (EIB, EBRD and IBRD) and governs them 
by special laws. The amount of guarantees approved by Parliament (including 
guarantees issued in the current year pursuant to decisions from the previous year) 
is not covered by the annual limit on the issuance of new ﬁ  nancial guarantees, set 
in annual state budget execution acts.
The Ministry of Finance participates in the negotiations on granting government-
guaranteed loans and, in accordance with the Government’s decision and on its 
behalf, approves contracts for the issue of government guarantees. The Govern-
ment may also delegate other state bodies to participate in the negotiations about 
government-guaranteed loans together with the Ministry of Finance. Subsequent 
proposals for amendments to a loan contract or a guarantee contract can be made 
subject to prior approval by the ﬁ  nance minister.





























































































































2.1 GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES AS STATE AID
Government guarantees constitute an instrument of state aid and their manage-
ment is governed by special regulations, such as the State Aid Act2, State Aid Re-
gulation3, Rulebook on the Form and Content and on the Manner of Collecting 
Data about, and Keeping Records of State Aid4 and Decision on Publishing Rules 
on State Aid in the Form of Guarantees5. 
Government guarantees differ from other state aid instruments, such as non-repay-
able funds or tax relief. By issuing guarantees, the government enters into an indi-
rect legal relationship with the lender. Guarantees are usually related to loans and 
other ﬁ  nancial obligations agreed between the borrower and the lender.
The European Commission’s deﬁ  nition of state aid (provided in its Notiﬁ  cation on 
the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to state aid in the form of 
government guarantees) includes all forms of guarantees issued, regardless of 
their legal base and the transaction which they cover. 
Guarantees can be issued individually or within a programme. According to the 
European Commission’s Notiﬁ  cation, guarantees can include aid granted by a 
member state or extended from government funds. Aid can be government gua-
rantees issued by the central government, a regional or local government unit or 
by companies in which government bodies have the prevailing inﬂ  uence. There 
are two types of guarantee aid: (1) aid granted to the borrower; and (2) aid granted 
to the lender.
2 OG, 47/2003; 60/2004 and 140/2005.
3 OG, 121/2003 and 50/2006.
4 OG, 11/2005.
5 OG, 13/2008 and 39/2009.
GRAPH 1
Guarantees approved according to the Government and Parliament decisions, 
2006-2010 (in billion kuna)
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257 Croatia has included all the provisions of the EC’s Notiﬁ  cation in its State Aid Act 
and the State Aid Regulation, which identify and assess individual cases in which 
issued government guarantees are considered as state aid. All public sector bodies 
authorised to grant or manage state aid in the form of guarantees are obliged to 
submit for approval to the Croatian Competition Agency the proposals for state 
aid in the form of guarantees.
3 TYPES OF GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES 
Government guarantees are ﬁ  nancial instruments by which the government war-
rants that an original debtor’s liabilities will be settled if the debtor is unable to 
settle them fully and on time. Since 1996, two types of guarantees have been in 
use in Croatia: performance guarantees and ﬁ  nancial guarantees (the latter can be 
divided into domestic and foreign ones). The guarantees are further classiﬁ  ed ac-
cording to economic sectors the credit liabilities of which are guaranteed, and 
according to the currency in which a guarantee is issued. The Government and the 
Ministry issue performance guarantees against a pledge of movable property that 
is readily cashable (e. g. airplanes, ships and other vehicles). Given such guaran-
tees, early collection of an entire loan or guarantee is rarely required, for it is an 
action that is guaranteed (the fulﬁ  lment of a contract to deliver/return goods or 
services).
The Government and the Ministry of Finance issue ﬁ  nancial guarantees of loans 
raised in the country and abroad, mainly for development projects in the areas of 
special state concern, for reconstruction projects in local government units, as in-
centives for new production, employment and technology, for tourist season plan-
ning, agricultural and shipbuilding projects, etc. From 1996 to 2010, the Govern-
ment extended ﬁ  nancial guarantees to legal entities in majority state ownership, 
local government units, extra-budgetary funds and the Croatian Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (CBRD).
The total amount of ﬁ  nancial guarantees called on is included in the public debt, 
and the amount of the public debt is limited in accordance with one of the conver-
gence criteria deﬁ  ned in the Maastricht Treaty. According to the Budget Act and 
annual state budget execution acts, the total amount of public debt may not exceed 
60% of the projected gross domestic product for the current year. Total public debt 
of Croatia jumped from 19.3% of GDP in 1995 to a high of 59% in 2010 (see table 
1). A strong contribution to the total public debt growth came from called-on gua-





























































































































Public debt (direct and potential), 1999-2010 

























1995 19.0 19.3 0 0 0 0 19.0 19.3
1996 30.8 28.5 0.8 0.7 0.0 0 31.5 29.2
1997 33.9 27.3 1.7 2.7 0.8 1.0 37.1 30.0
1998 36.1 26.2 3.7 6.8 2.3 2.8 45.4 33.0
1999 46.8 28.5 11.9 7.2 1.3 0.8 59.9 36.5
2000 60.5 34.3 13.0 7.3 2.1 1.2 75.6 42.8
2001 67.2 35.2 14.6 7.6 2.8 1.4 84.6 44.3
2002 72.5 34.8 16.1 7.7 3.8 1.8 92.4 44.4
2003 81.2 35.8 15.4 6.8 4.9 2.2 101.6 44.7
2004 92.8 37.8 12.3 5.0 5.8 2.4 110.9 45.2
2005 101.2 38.3 12.5 4.7 7.1 2.7 120.8 45.7
2006 102.2 35.7 14.2 5.0 7.7 2.7 124.1 43.3
2007 104.1 33.1 17.4 5.5 9.7 3.1 131.1 41.7
2008 99.5 29.1 33.8 9.9 10.8 3.2 144.0 42.1
2009 117.9 35.2 37.5 11.2 12.4 3.7 167.9 50.0
2010 137.9 41.2 44.5 13.3 13.9 4.2 196.4 58.7
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2011.
3.1   GUARANTEES OF THE LIABILITIES OF THE CROATIAN BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
Since 1992, the CBRD has granted loans for projects aimed at the reconstruction 
and promotion of Croatian economy, where banks and other ﬁ  nancial institutions 
are unable to provide the necessary funding. Originally, loans with guarantees 
have been granted for the recovery of the war-damaged economy. Since 2006, 
however, the CBRD has expanded its activities by ﬁ  nancing small and medium-
sized enterprises, infrastructure and export, securing Croatian goods and services 
exports against non-market risks and providing incentives to environmental pro-
tection. The bank also grants loans and other placements, issues bank and other 
guarantees, enters into insurance and reinsurance contracts and invests in debt and 





























































































































259 In the period from 1997 to 2010, the CBRD’s annual issue of guarantees averaged 
about 1.3 billion kuna (mainly in euro). Called-on guarantees issued by the CBRD are 
included in the overall statistics of called-on government guarantees. The CBRD’s 
debt grew from kuna 1 billion kuna in 1999 to 14 billion kuna in 2010 (see graph 2).
GRAPH 2
Issued guarantees and debt of the CBRD, 1997-2010 (in billion kuna)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the CBRD and the Ministry of Finance data, 2011.
The government guarantees the liabilities of the CBRD jointly and severally, un-
conditionally, irrevocably and at ﬁ  rst call, without issuing any special guarantee 
document. The CBRD does not allocate special reserves for claims secured by 
government guarantees. Provisions for contingent losses are made on an annual 
basis in the State Budget, based on the data delivered by the CBRD to the Ministry 
of Finance.
Apart from direct annual allocations from the State Budget (providing credit 
through the initial capital of the CBRD and supporting exports), the Government 
supports the CBRD through government guarantees.
GRAPH 3
Government ﬁ  nancial guarantees issued to the CBRD and their potential maturi-
ties, 1996-2020 (in billion kuna)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the CBRD and Official Gazette, 2010.
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260 Government guarantees to the CBRD are mainly intended for shipyards and com-
panies in majority state ownership. A sizeable amount of guarantees is also provi-
ded to the tourist sector. These guarantees pose a risk to the state’s ﬁ  scal position, 
if the Government assumes the CBRD debt directly or through called-on guaran-
tees. For example, in May 2011 the Government enacted a law transferring the 
credit liabilities of four shipyards, secured by government guarantees, to direct 
public debt6. 
The CBRD is not subject to regulations on the allocation and maintenance of re-
serve requirements held with the central bank, or on setting limits on the volume 
and growth of placements, neither is it subject to regulations on concluding credit 
and guarantee transactions between extra-budgetary users, or to the Insurance Act. 
The CBRD is not subject to the corporate income tax.
4 CRITERIA FOR ISSUING GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES
From 1994 to 1999, there were no clear-cut criteria for approving government 
guarantees. Independently of the Ministry of Finance, the Government issued 
guarantees for loans taken on mainly by public sector institutions, but also by the 
private sector. In this period, the criteria and conditions for approving government 
guarantees were laid down in annual state budget execution acts. These acts also 
regulated the sources of funding for government liabilities, as well as the terms 
and the manner of their settlement. From 1999 on, the approval of government 
guarantees has been subject to the prior opinion of the Ministry of Finance and the 
responsible ministry, to which applicants must submit detailed ﬁ  nancial data 
showing their ﬁ  nancial positions and data on the development programmes. It was 
only in 2003 that the Government set the guarantee approval criteria (OG, 16/03 
and 108/03); guarantees are only given to budget users, extra-budgetary users, 
local government units, and the CBRD. The Government does not guarantee the 
coverage of current costs or operating losses of companies (salaries, current as-
sets, etc.), neither does it give guarantees to beneﬁ  ciaries who default on their 
liabilities to the state, and have not obtained positive opinions of the responsible 
state or business audit for the last two business years.
In the event of a change in company ownership (particularly of companies in 
majority or predominant state ownership) the guarantee is withdrawn and renewed 
under new conditions. Pursuant to a Government’s decision, guarantees can be 
transferred to another beneﬁ  ciary (a legal successor), depending on its business 
condition, development plans and the interests of the country.
4.1 ENSURING THE REPAYMENT OF GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES
From 1996 to 1998, guarantees were only approved based on previously obtained 
commercial bank guarantees. From 1999 on, guarantees to legal entities in majo-
rity private ownership were only approved upon receipt of blank signed bills with 




























































































































261 a bill of exchange statement in favour of the Republic of Croatia and authenticated 
declarations of the members of the management and supervisory boards that the 
loan would be repaid properly. With a view to sharing the credit or guarantee risk, 
the Government, banks and other legal entities may give super-guarantees, coun-
ter-guarantees or guarantees with mutual risk sharing7. 
The state budget execution acts for the period from 2000 to 2011 introduced some 
novelties with regard to securing the collection of guarantees. Speciﬁ  cally, the 
approval of guarantees was conditioned by ensuring the repayment by pledging 
the property of an applicant for credit or by other security instruments. The Gover-
nment charges a commission on issued ﬁ  nancial guarantees at a rate of 0.5% on 
their value. The commission is payable before serving the guarantee document on 
the beneﬁ  ciary and is paid into the state budget. In the case of called-on govern-
ment guarantees, the Ministry of Finance may order the Financial Agency to free-
ze the debtor’s account. In order to collect the debt arising from due guarantees, 
the Ministry of Finance and the debtor may conclude an agreement on debt repay-
ment by instalments over a maximum period of one year. 
4.1.1 Guarantee reserves
Since 2000, the Ministry of Finance has charged each applicant for a guarantee a 
commission of 0.5% on the value of the guarantee. The commission is paid into 
the guarantee reserves, being a potential source of funds for the repayment of due 
(protested) guarantees. Apart from the commission, the Government and the Mi-
nistry of Finance provide for additional budgetary funds in the reserves for gua-
rantees that have been protested. The funds earmarked in the guarantee reserves 
are used for covering the costs of called-on guarantees from the previous year 
(carried forward to the current year) as well as for new protested guarantees. After 
a guarantee is protested, the costs are debited from the guarantee reserves, and at 
the end of a ﬁ  scal year, the total guarantees called on in that year are assessed in 
order to determine the capacities of debtors to meet their liabilities. This provides 
a basis for classifying the expenditures for current protested guarantees as the cost 
of the public debt repayment or cost of the guarantee reserves for the next year. 
Ideally, instead of a uniform commission of 0.5% on the value of a guarantee, a 
risk charge should be calculated for each individual guarantee. One of the methods 
for this would be to calculate the so-called subsidy cost (Polackova Brixi and 
Schick, 2002). The subsidy cost in terms of a guaranteed loan is deﬁ  ned as the 
estimated long-term cost calculated on the basis of a net current value, minus 
operating expenses. The net current value is calculated by discounting the antici-
pated future cash outﬂ  ows (payments for protested guarantees) and inﬂ  ows (fees 
and refunds associated with protested guarantees), where the discount rate can be 
the interest rate paid by the Government on a loan with the same maturity. The 
subsidy cost thus calculated can be used for the assessment of guarantee reserves. 




























































































































262 The subsidy cost must be revised annually during the life cycle of the guaranteed 
loan.
The extent of risk sharing between the guarantor and the guarantee beneﬁ  ciary 
should be larger. The usual risk sharing instruments include: the issuance of a 
guarantee only for a part of the potential loss, collection of risk premiums and the 
revocation of a guarantee agreement in case of a moral hazard. In an ideal situa-
tion, part of the risk would be taken by the guarantee beneﬁ  ciary (a bank), as this 
would be the motive for a more critical assessment of its own exposure. (In Cana-
da, for example, banks bear at least 15% of the net loss arising from a default on 
guaranteed loan repayment (Polackova Brixi and Schick, 2002).
4.2 PAYMENT OF DUE GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES ISSUED
The government pays its due liabilities arising from guarantees in the cases when: 
(a) the debtor fails to pay the entire amount, or a part of the loan in accordance 
with the terms of the loan agreement; and (b) the creditor takes the measures and 
actions laid down in the agreement concerning the loan and the collection of due 
liabilities from the borrower. Where such terms are not set out in the agreement on 
the issuance of government guarantees, the ﬁ  nance minister and the creditor deter-
mine the measures to be taken when the government guarantees fall due and the 
time limits within which the Government should settle the due liabilities.
Debt collection from a guarantee beneﬁ  ciary
Where a guarantee call on, the Ministry of Finance can take the following measu-
res (on behalf of the state):
1)   acquire equity in the companies for the state by offsetting the claims arising 
from the loans granted against the guarantees paid;
2)   subject to the Government’s approval, the ﬁ  nance minister can, at the debtor’s 
request (and given the appropriate security and interest), defer the repayment, 
agree with the debtor on the debt repayment by instalments, or change the pre-
dictable payment dynamics, if this would signiﬁ  cantly improve the debtor’s 
ability to repay the debt (this refers to debtors from whom the entire debt ari-
sing from given government guarantees could not otherwise be collected).
Should the Ministry of Finance fail to collect the claims through regular channels, 
the matter is referred to the State Attorney’s Ofﬁ  ce for further action.
5 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES 
Records on guarantees are kept off the balance sheet, which means that they are not 
included in the ﬁ  nancial statements, but the Ministry of Finance keeps them sepa-
rately under the “contingent debt” category. From 1995 to 2006, the Government 
and the Ministry of Finance issued ﬁ  nancial and performance guarantees, and since 





























































































































Issued and active (ﬁ  nancial and performance) guarantees, 1996-2010 
(in billion kuna)
Planned 
ﬁ  nancial 
Issued 












1996 2.5 0.8 0.1 0.7 1.4 2.2  0.8   
1997 3.0 3.2 1.4 1.8 3.0 6.2  3.2   
1998 1.0 5.1 1.3 3.8 3.4 8.5  10.2 
1999 3.0 5.9 1.2 4.8 1.8 7.7  10.4 
2000     5.4 5.0 0.4 4.3 9.7  15.7 
2001     7.7 3.0 4.7 6.0  13.7  18.1 
2002     8.4 5.7 2.7 2.9  11.2  20.1 
2003 5.9 9.0 5.0 4.0 2.7  11.7  20.5 
2004 4.9 5.8 2.9 2.9 4.8  10.6  18.3 
2005 4.0 3.7 2.7 0.9 3.5 7.2  19.7 
2006 4.0 9.4 4.8 4.6 1.5  10.9  22.0 
2007 4.9  13.6 4.5 9.1     13.6  27.1 
2008 7.4 7.9 3.4 4.5     7.9 44.7 
2009 4.9 9.4 4.5 4.9      9.4  50.7 
2010 4.9 9.6 5.0 4.6 9.6 58.8 
2011* 4.9 58.9
* For 2011 as at 31 January.
Source: Ministry of Finance and CNB, 2011. 
Applications for guarantees grew markedly after 2003, with the bulk of guaran-
tees being issued for domestic borrowing. However, in the last three years, gua-
rantees for borrowing abroad outdid those for domestic borrowing. It is worth 
noting that from 1996 to 2007, the Government approved performance guarantees 
mainly for loans taken on by shipyards, whereas from 2007 on, performance gua-
rantees were substituted by ﬁ  nancial ones. This substitution led to an increase in 
the amount of active ﬁ  nancial guarantees as contingent liabilities of the govern-
ment. Active guarantees rose from 0.8 billion kuna in 1996 to 58.8 billion kuna in 
2010. With the exception of 2005, in all the years, the amounts of issued ﬁ  nancial 





























































































































264 Limits on the issue of ﬁ  nancial guarantees. In the annual state budget execution 
acts, the Government lays down the amount of guarantees to be issued in a parti-
cular year. As no such amount was laid down in the state budget execution acts for 
the period 2000-2003, the issuance of guarantees (with no limit set) was left to the 
discretion of the Government and the Ministry of Finance. Regretfully, for most 
of the reference period, the amount of ﬁ  nancial guarantees exceeded the prescri-
bed limit. A sizeable amount of guarantees was also approved by Parliament’s 
decisions, disregarding the annual limits set by the Government.
Domestic and foreign ﬁ  nancial guarantees. Guarantees for borrowing in the coun-
try make the bulk of total guarantees (53%), whereas guarantees for borrowing 
abroad account for 47% of the total (see graph 4). There is no pattern in the distri-
bution of domestic and foreign guarantees, which differs from year to year.
GRAPH 4
Domestic and foreign ﬁ  nancial guarantees as a % of total guarantees issued, 
2000-2010
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2011.
Dominant in the structure of ﬁ  nancial guarantees issued are guarantees for bor-
rowing from domestic and foreign commercial banks, ﬁ  nancial  institutions 
(mainly EBRD, EIB, etc.) and the CBRD.
Currency structure of issued ﬁ  nancial guarantees. From 2000 on, guarantees de-
nominated in euro predominated in the structure of loans with government gua-
rantees (see graph 5).
Issued ﬁ  nancial guarantees by sector. Guarantees of the liabilities of public tran-
sport companies account for the largest share in total ﬁ  nancial guarantees issued. 
The second largest category are ﬁ  nancial guarantees for the borrowing of business 
sector enterprises, mainly “big loss-makers” like Split Ironworks, Sisak Tube Rol-
ling Mill and TLM Šibenik, which are planned to be issued until their ﬁ  nal restruc-







2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010  Average
             0 0 - 1 0




























































































































265 struction programmes and for the ﬁ  nancing of loans to small and medium-sized 
enterprises in the period from 2001 to 2002 (through the CBRD). Numerous gua-
rantees were also given to the Croatian Railways, which took on short-term loans 
for liquidity maintenance (particularly during 2002 and 2003) (see graph 6).
GRAPH 5
Currency structure of issued ﬁ  nancial guarantees, 2000-2010 (%)
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2011.
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GRAPH 6
Structure and value of issued ﬁ  nancial guarantees by sector, 2000-2010
(in billion kuna)
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2011.
During 2000, the Government adopted a package of measures deﬁ  ning a new po-
sition and terms of operation of shipyards pending their privatisation. From 2000 
on, the issuance of performance guarantees increased, and from 2006 to 2011, a 
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266 considerable amount of guarantees was issued in the form of state aid for shipyard 
restructuring. After the restructuring and privatisation, guarantees to shipyards 
should be reduced and granted in accordance with EU rules for state aid alloca-
tion.
Issued ﬁ  nancial guarantees by type of creditor. Early in the reference period, the 
lending activities included domestic commercial banks and, particularly, the 
CBRD, given its development mission. As the country’s investment credit rating 
improved, the participation of foreign commercial and development banks (e.g. 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW), as well as other international ﬁ  nancial in-
stitutions (EBRD, EIB, etc.), extending loans for infrastructure projects (roads, 
motor roads, railways, air transport facilities, ports, gas transportation systems 
and electric power industry) increased over time. Since 2009, among the creditors 
have also been foreign suppliers and ship buyers (see graph 7). 
GRAPH 7
Structure of issued ﬁ  nancial guarantees by type of creditor, 2000-2010 (%)
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2011.
Protested guarantees. A portion of government-guaranteed loans fall due annu-
ally. The guarantees are protested and included in the direct public debt. In the 
period from 1999 to 2004, the majority of guarantees fell due, imposing an addi-
tional burden to the state budget. Guarantees issued to agriculture (for the ﬁ  nan-
cing of special programmes, rescheduling of previously granted loans and procu-
rement of agricultural machinery), tourist sector (for the reconstruction of hotel 
facilities and preparation of facilities for the tourist season) and business sector (as 
aid to enterprises in difﬁ  culties, and for the ﬁ  nancing of ﬁ  xed working capital) 
were called on. A minor portion of protested guarantees was seen in the transport 
sector. A sizeable portion of guarantees extended to shipyards were protested in 
2009, and it is expected to grow further until their desired privatisation. In the 
1998-2010 period, protested guarantees amounted to 9 billion kuna, and were 
mainly extended to the business sector, shipbuilding, agriculture and tourism (see 
graph 8).
 CBRD     Domestic commercial banks     Foreign commercial banks




































































































































Sectoral distribution of protested ﬁ  nancial guarantees, 1998-2010 
(in billion kuna)
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2011.
Refunds to the State Budget from original debtors. After guarantees have been 
protested, the Government and the Ministry of Finance try to collect the debt in-
curred from the relevant companies. Regrettably, refunds to the Budget are low, 
suggesting that the original debtors are still in difﬁ  culties and are unable to settle 
their credit liabilities guaranteed by the State Budget (see table 3).
TABLE 3
Refunds to the State Budget from original debtors, 2001-2010 (in billion kuna 
and as a % of protested ﬁ  nancial guarantees)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total 
protested 
ﬁ  nancial 
guaran-
tees









2.78 17.75 16.26 21.86 13.87 7.56 10.12 7.61 0.90 0.55
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the Ministry of Finance, 2010.
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268 In the 2001-2010 period, original debtors repaid as little as about 12% of the amount 
of protested guarantees to the Budget. This percentage varied from year to year, and 
was particularly low in 2010 (0.55%), when shipyards’ guarantees fell due.
Guarantee reserves. The Government and Ministry of Finance provide funds for 
protested guarantees from the guarantee reserves (see table 4). After protesting the 
guarantees, the Government and the Ministry take measures to collect the debt 
from the original debtor. However, the problem is that the original debtors are 
insolvent and unable to meet their liabilities to the state. Therefore, government 
guarantees actually represent a classic form of state aid to industrial sectors pen-
ding their restructuring or privatisation.
TABLE 4
Guarantee reserves and protested ﬁ  nancial guarantees, 2000-2010
(in million kuna and %)
  Guarantees (in kuna) Guarantee reserves 
as a % of
Protested 
guarantees 











2000 0,212 0,749 1,075 20 28 70
2001 0,150 0,496 0,670 22 30 74
2002 0,400 0,730 0,950 42 55 77
2003 0,550 0,690 4,712 12 80 15
2004 0,314 0,620 7,074 4 51 9
2005 0,400 0,400 2,790 14 100 14
2006 0,290 0,463 1,526 19 63 30
2007 0,400 0,326 2,911 14 123 11
2008 0,267 0,447 7,257 4 60 6
2009 0,267  2,113 3,811 7  13  55
2010 1,000  1,099 3,085 32  100  36
2011 1,000 7,442 13
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the Ministry of Finance, 2011.
Only in 2005, 2007 and 2010, were guarantee reserves sufﬁ  cient to cover the entire 
amount of protested guarantees. In 2007, there was even a surplus in the guarantee 
reserves after protested guarantees had been covered. In other years, the reserves 
were not enough to cover the protested guarantees, which required the provision of 
additional funds in the State Budget. More than 70% of due guarantees were prote-
sted in the period from 2000 to 2002. This percentage was falling till 2010, so that 




























































































































269 Called-on guarantees represent potential government debt, as the original debtor 
has still not met the guaranteed liabilities. Called-on guarantees grew from about 
10 billion kuna in 1998 to 59 billion kuna in 2010 (see graph 9).
GRAPH 9
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Source: CNB, 2011.
A marked increase in called-on guarantees since 2007 has been due to the substitution 
of performance guarantees (mainly extended to shipyards) by ﬁ  nancial guarantees.
Potential maturities of government guarantees. Public sector institutions, the lia-
bilities of which are guaranteed by the government (State Budget), incurred liabi-
lities till 2037, to repay the principal and interest on the borrowing guaranteed by 
the State Budget (see graph 10). The amounts and potential maturity dates for the 
ﬁ  nancial liabilities differ from year to year. In the period from 2010-2012, the 
government is likely to come under relatively strong pressure from potential calls 
on extended guarantees and their conversion into the direct public debt.
GRAPH 10
Amounts of potential maturities of guarantees issued from 1996 to 2037 (in billion kuna)8
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the Ministry of Finance.
8 Due to a lack of information on the terms of borrowing and repayment (annual or semi-annual) of the prin-
cipal and interest on the borrowing of the original debtor, the calculation was based on the assumption that 









































































































































































































































































































270 In only three reference years, the Government might be faced with claims for 
about 13 billion kuna (3 billion kuna in 2010, 6 billion in 2011 and 4 billion in 
2012). The maturity risks of guarantees will depend on the ability of original 
debtors to settle their liabilities arising from agreed loans in a timely manner. The 
Government and Ministry of Finance will certainly have to deﬁ  ne and carry out 
measures in order to prevent the guarantees from signiﬁ  cantly jeopardising the 
ﬁ  nancial position of the state and speeding up the growth of public debt and bud-
get deﬁ  cit. 
Maturities of guarantees by year of issue. Potential maturities of guarantees by 
year represent useful information for estimating their potential effect on direct 
government liabilities (see graph 11). The maturity calculation is based on the 
Ministry of Finance data. Brieﬂ  y, from 1996 to 2010, the Government and Parlia-
ment issued 1,113 government guarantees worth 105 billion kuna, with average 
maturity of 7.4 years.
GRAPH 11












1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the Ministry of Finance, 2011.
The average maturity of guarantees was about 3.6 years in the 1996-1998 period, 
and was extended in the following years. Thus, the average maturities for the 
guarantees issued in 1999 were about 18 years. However, the maturities of guaran-
tees issued from 2007 to 2010 shortened again, falling to about 4 years.
6 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES ON PUBLIC DEBT
Issued and still outstanding guarantees pose a potential threat to the public debt 
growth. In 2010, general government debt, excluding guarantees, accounted for 
41% of GDP; with called-on guarantees included, total public debt accounted for 
59% of GDP. Given the marked growth in guarantees issued since 2007, the analy-
sis of their impact on public debt has become increasingly important. In 2010, 
outstanding guarantees accounted for as much as 18% of GDP. It is very likely 




























































































































271 The Government and Ministry of Finance have been aware of the risk of potential 
maturity of ﬁ  nancial guarantees, and particularly of their impact on the budget 
deﬁ  cit and public debt growth. With the view to estimating the impact of guaran-
tees on public debt, the Ministry of Finance (i.e. its Bureau for Macroeconomic 
Analysis) has, since 2007, made up tests of public debt sensitivity to changes in 
GDP growth rates, maturities of guarantees, foreign exchange rates and changes 
in the primary general government budget deﬁ  cit. Public debt has also shown 
great sensitivity to changes in contingent liabilities (guarantees), which would 
result in an increase in direct public debt to about 54% of GDP in 2010. The test 
results point to a need for moderating the issuance of government guarantees. 
Moreover, in order to curb the growth of contingent liabilities, the restructuring of 
certain economic sectors must be continued.
GRAPH 12
Public and general government debts, 1995-2010 (as a % of GDP)
Note: General government debt comprises the direct debts of the state budget, extra-budgetary 
users and local government units. Public debt includes called-on guarantees and the CBRD 
debt.
Source: The Ministry of Finance and CNB, 2011.
It is obvious that guarantees have a direct impact on public debt at the time of their 
being protested. Now, if guarantees do inﬂ  uence the general government’s direct 
debt growth, then the question is raised of their justiﬁ  ability, given the suspicion 
that protested guarantees are ﬁ  nanced through borrowing. On the other hand, this 
would mean that the guarantee issuing policy is inefﬁ  cient, because the protested 
guarantees should be ﬁ  nanced from guarantee reserves. Finally, the level of public 
debt, as the sum of direct and indirect liabilities, would also be thrown into doubt, 
where it is also possible that the potential debt (guarantees) create a need for bor-
rowing, so that liabilities arising from the same source would be twice included in 
the public debt – as direct and indirect liabilities. 
Simple linear regression model
In order to test the hypothesis about the impact of issued guarantees on the amount 
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272 del, with the independent variable being the value of issued guarantees and the 
dependent variable – the amount of the central government debt:
 y t = αn + βn xt,n + εn, n = 0, 1,..., 7  (1)
where yt is the value of the central government debt in a quarter t, αn is the constant 
member of the regression model with an annual lag n, βn is the regression coefﬁ  -
cient of the model with an annual lag n, xt,n is the value of issued guarantees in a 
quarter t with an annual lag n9, and εn represents independent and equally distribu-
ted, normal random variables with zero expectancy and a variance of σ2. 
The analysis was based on a sample of quarterly data on the balance of called-on 
guarantees and of the central government debt from the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2000 to the 
ﬁ  rst quarter of 2010. Before testing the functional dependence of variables in the 
model, it was necessary to test the statonarity of the observed series. One of the 
ways to do this was to apply the ADF (Augmented Dickey Fuller) test (see table 
5).
TABLE 5
Augmented Dickey Fuller test results in levels
Variables Intercept and trend Intercept None
Guarantees 0.9843 0.9964 0.9984
Debt 0.6624 0.5464 0.9993
ΔGuarantees 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ΔDebt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The null hypothesis for data series expressed in levels at a signiﬁ  cance level of 5% 
can be accepted, i.e. the observed series are non-stationary. When taking ﬁ  rst dif-
ferences, the series become stationary (the null hypothesis of the existence of a 
unit root is rejected at a signiﬁ  cance level of 5%, so that the model assumes a new 
form:
 ∆ yt = αn + βn ∆xt,n + εn, n = 0, 1, ... 7  (2)
where ∆yt represents the quarterly change in the value of the central government 
debt in a quarter t, αn is the constant member of the regression model with a lag n, 
βn is the regression coefﬁ  cient of the model with an annual lag n, ∆xt,n is a quart-
erly change in the value of issued guarantees in a quarter t with an annual lag n, 
9 The regression model with an annual lag in the independent variable is used to establish the impact of the value 




























































































































273 and εn represents independent, equally distributed, normal random variables with 
zero expectancy and a variance of σ2.
Intuitively, it can be assumed that guarantees issued in a particular year do not 
have too strong an inﬂ  uence on the central government’s direct borrowing in that 
year. However, there is a possibility that a portion of guarantees would be prote-
sted over time, so that the government must even take loans to ﬁ  nance its direct 
liabilities arising from the protested guarantees. In order to test this hypothesis, 
eight separate regression analyses were carried out with a view to establishing the 
inﬂ  uence of changes in issued guarantees on the change in the level of state debt 
over a period of seven years from issuing the guarantees. The results of the regres-
sion analyses are shown in table 6.
TABLE 6







































































Note: p-values are put in parentheses, with *, ** and *** standing for statistical significance 
levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The regression analysis results reveal considerably high p-values (hence the mo-
del is not representative) for series with annual lags (n>0), and (in such cases) the 
determination coefﬁ  cient is relatively low (except for n=1 and n=3). The variable 




























































































































274 deviation coefﬁ  cient stands at 32.31%. An estimated parameter [β=-0.7629] of the 
stated regression models shows that by issuing guarantees in the amount of [Δx=1 
million kuna] (in a particular quarter), the central government debt decreases by 
[Δy=762.9 thousand kuna] (in the same quarter).
Taking into account that the model describes a relatively complex phenomenon 
like the central government borrowing (which depends on a series of different 
factors), the ﬁ  nding that only one variable describes over 32% of deviations is 
quite interesting. However, the economic interpretation of the results is limited, 
because, given that n=0, it cannot be concluded that issued guarantees upon their 
maturity pose a threat to the public debt, but, due to the negative value of the re-
gression coefﬁ  cient, it is rather possible that direct central government borrowing 
is substituted by issuing guarantees. 
7 CONCLUSION
Since 1996, Croatia has increased the issuance of government ﬁ  nancial and per-
formance guarantees as an instrument of state aid aimed at ensuring favourable 
borrowing conditions for public sector institutions, mainly companies in majority 
state ownership. Regrettably, government guarantees have rarely been part of de-
ﬁ  ned strategies and goals of the public debt and risk management. Each protested 
guarantee affects the public debt growth and, according to ESA 95 methodology, 
it is automatically included in the budget deﬁ  cit. However, the actual ﬁ  nancial 
impact of guarantees will be seen in the near future, as Croatia joins the EU. It is 
worth noting that the largest inclusion of guarantees in the public debt pursuant to 
the Act Governing the Rights and Obligations of Shipyards in the Process of Re-
structuring has not been dealt with in this paper.
The regression analysis results demonstrate that government guarantees do not 
have a statistically signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence on the growth of direct government debt. 
It is beyond dispute that the central government debt is gradually substituted by 
issued guarantees. While there is no indication that government guarantees in-
ﬂ  uence the public debt growth in the same period, there is evidence for state debt 
growth in the long run, due to a very low collection rate of protested guarantees. 
The research results should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, they provi-
de a reliable basis for a comprehensive analysis of the inﬂ  uence of issued guaran-
tees on the growth of direct government liabilities. Future research should be fo-
cused on the analyses of:
• potential maturities of guarantees based on quarterly data;
•  the impact of changes in government guarantees on changes in the level of public 
debt and the possible inﬂ  uence of issued guarantees on annual government bor-
rowing, and
•   the risks of potential maturities of issued guarantees according to main economic 




























































































































275 Future research should establish whether government guarantees are primarily 
extended to fast growing sectors that stimulate the overall economic growth or to 
the so-called zombie companies which would not survive in the market without 
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